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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PAM JOY REALTY, 
a California corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
v. 
5900 Associates, L.C., 
a Utah limited liability 
company, and John Does 1-10, 
unknown individuals, 
Defendants and Appellees 
Case No. 940662-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a summary judgment of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County. The judgment was entered on 
July 27, 1994. The notice of appeal was filed on August 23, 1994. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k)(1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the parol evidence rule bar the intentional or 
negligent misrepresentation claims of a buyer of real estate who 
signs an "as is" agreement of sale? [R. 57-59; 137-38.] This issue 
presents a question of law for the court to review under a 
correctness standard. Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650 
(Utah 1994) . 
2. Does the doctrine of merger bar the intentional or 
negligent misrepresentation claims of a buyer of real estate who 
signs an "as is" agreement of sale? [R. 57-59; 137-38.] This issue 
presents a question of law for the court to review under a 
correctness standard. Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650 
(Utah 1994) . 
3. Did the trial court err in concluding as a matter of law 
that plaintiff cannot prevail on its claim of intentional 
misrepresentation in this case? [R. 59-62; 140-41.] This issue 
presents a question of law for the court to review under a 
correctness standard. TS1 Partnership v. Allred, 877 P.2d 156 (Utah 
App. 1994). 
4. Did the trial court err in concluding as a matter of law 
that plaintiff cannot prevail on its claim of negligent 
misrepresentation in this case? [R. 59-62; 140-41.] This issue 
presents a question of law for the court to review under a 
correctness standard. TS1 Partnership v. Allred, 877 P. 2d 156 
(Utah App. 1994) . 
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5. Does the parol evidence or merger doctrine bar the 
reformation claim of a buyer cf real estate who signs an "as is'1 
agreement of sale? [R. 57-59; 137-40] This issue presents a 
question of law for the court to review under a correctness 
stardard. Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650 (Utah 1994). 
6. Did the trial court err in concluding as a matter of law 
that plaintiff cannot prevail on its claim for reformation of the 
written contract in this case? [R. 59; 139-40.] This issue 
presents a question of law for the court to review under a 
correctness standard. Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650 
(Utah 1994) . 
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DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
The issues related to the trial court's erroneous grant of 
summary judgment in this case are determined under Rule 56 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff and appellant, Pam Joy 
Realty, against the defendant and appellee, 5900 Associates, L.C., 
to enforce the terms of an oral promise to provide a standard 
commercial five-year roof warranty or to recover damages for fraud 
in connection with Pam Joy's purchase of a building from 5900 
Associates. The defendant seller moved for summary judgment prior 
to filing an answer which was granted by the court on the grounds 
that plaintiff's claims were barred by the parol evidence rule and 
merger doctrine, there were no genuine issues of material fact, and 
that defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Plaintiff appeals from the adverse summary judgment below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are marshalled and presented in a light 
most favorable to the losing party below in accordance with the 
appropriate standard of review of summary judgments on appeal. 
Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'1 Cos., 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992) 
(citing King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858 (Utah 
1992)) . 
1. The real property which is the subject of this appeal is 
located at 201 East 5900 South, Murray, Utah (the "Property"). [R. 
2.] 
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2. Plaintiff and appellant, Pam Joy Realty ("Pam Joy"), is 
a California corporation doing business in Salt Lake County, Utah* 
Alan Smalley ("Smalley") is a principal of Pam Joy. [R. 2; 71.] 
3. Defendant and appellee, 5900 Associates, L.C. ("5900 
Associates"), is a Utah limited liability company, which owned the 
Property prior to June 28, 1993. [R. 3; 41.] Barlow Briggs 
("Briggs") is the manager of this company. [R. 21;41.] 
4. In early 1993, plaintiff and defendant began negotiating 
for the purchase and sale of the Property. In that negotiation 
Smalley was plaintiff's representative and Briggs was the 
representative of the defendant. Affidavit of Alan Smalley 
("Smalley Affidavit") at 552,3. [R. 74-75.]; Affidavit of Barlow 
Briggs ("Briggs Affidavit") at 5 4 [R. 42.] 
5. In connection with plaintiff's negotiations to purchase 
the Property, Smalley had several conversations with Briggs about 
plaintiff's need to receive a standard commercial five-year 
warranty for the roof of the building (the "Building") on the 
Property. The Warranty would cover both labor and materials and 
would exclude only damage caused by the owner or his agents, and 
any damage resulting from mechanical or heating/air conditioning or 
ventilation systems operation or malfunction (the "Warranty"). 
Briggs as the representative for defendant, told Smalley that 
defendant had such a Warranty as a result of having recently re-
roofed the entire Building. Briggs promised to immediately provide 
Smalley with the Warranty. Smalley Affidavit at 54. [R. 75.] 
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6. In addition, on at least one occasion Smalley made a 
request in writing for the Warranty for the roof of the Building. 
A true and correct copy of this writing dated April 22, 1993 is 
attached to the Smalley Affidavit as Exhibit "AH . Defendant 
responded in writing on April 28, 1993 that the request was 
"acceptable". A true and correct copy of that response is attached 
to the Smalley Affidavit as Exhibit "B". Smalley Affidavit at H5. 
[R. 75.] 
7. On several occasions Briggs represented to Smalley that 
the roof of the Building had been completely re-roofed by Layton 
Roofing and that Layton had given defendant a Warranty for the roof 
for a period of five years as part of its roofing contract. 
Smalley Affidavit at 56. [R. 75.] 
8. Briggs further stated to Smalley that the Warranty would 
be assigned to plaintiff in connection with the plaintiff's 
purchase of the Property. Smalley Affidavit at H7. [R. 76.] 
9. All of these representations by Briggs took place prior 
to the sale of the Property. As plaintiff's representative, 
Smalley relied upon Briggs' representations that the Warranty would 
be delivered. Smalley would not have proceeded to close the 
purchase of the Property without Briggs' representations that the 
Warranty would be delivered to the plaintiff. Sraalley Affidavit at 
58. [R. 76.] 
10. In reliance upon Briggs' representation that the Warranty 
would be assigned to plaintiff as part of its purchase of the 
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Property, plaintiff proceeded to close its purchase of the Property 
on or about June 28, 1993. Smalley Affidavit at 59. [R. 76.] 
11. Exhibit "A" reproduced herein at Addendum A is a copy of 
the preliminary Earnest Money Sales Agreement covering the purchase 
and sale of the Property. [R. 21.] 
12. Exhibit "B" reproduced herein at Addendum B is a copy of 
the Closing Statement between the buyer and the seller of the 
Property. [R. 21.] 
13. Exhibit "C" reproduced herein at Addendum C is a copy of 
the Warranty Deed covering the sale of the Property. [R. 22.] 
14. The Warranty was not delivered at the closing of the sale 
of the Property. Smalley Affidavit at 110. [R. 76.] 
15. Thereafter, plaintiff continued to request that defendant 
deliver the Warranty. Those requests are set forth in numerous 
letters and memoranda from Smalley to Briggs. Copies of some of 
these letters are attached to the Smalley Affidavit as Exhibit "C". 
Smalley Affidavit at 511. [R. 76.] 
16. In response to each such communication from Smalley, 
defendant continued to promise that the Warranty would be forth 
coming. For example, in defendant's letter to plaintiff of August 
12, 1993, Briggs indicates, "Layton Roofing Company is preparing a 
five year warranty". A copy of Briggs' August 12, 1993 letter is 
attached to the Smalley Affidavit as Exhibit "D." Smalley 
Affidavit at 112. [R. 76.] 
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17. Despite Briggs' numerous representations that a Warranty 
would be provided, none has been delivered. Smalley Affidavit at 
113. [R. 77.] 
18. Plaintiff recently discovered that Layton Roofing did not 
re-roof the entire roof of the Building, but rather made only 
certain limited repairs thereto. Smalley Affidavit at 514. [R. 
77. ] 
19. Moreover, Layton Roofing has indicated to Smalley that it 
will issue a Warranty but only if it is paid a sum in excess of 
$19,000, which will enable it to do such additional work to the 
roof as is necessary for Layton Roofing to issue the Warranty. 
Smalley Affidavit at fl5. [R. 77.] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. 
PLAINTIFF'S FRAUD CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE PAROL EVIDENCE 
RULE OR MERGER DOCTRINE. 
A. Intentional Misrepresentation. 
1. Parol Evidence. 
An "as is" provision in a real estate contract does not bar a 
claim based on allegations of fraud. Parol evidence is admissible 
on the issue. 
2. Merger Doctrine. 
Fraud is an exception to the applicability of the merger 
doctrine. Parol evidence is admissible on the issue. 
B. Negligent Misrepresentation. 
1. Parol Evidence. 
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Although Utah courts have not directly held that a claim of 
negligent misrepresentation justifies an exception to the parol 
evidence rule, this case presents an opportunity to do so. This 
court should clearly adopt the negligent misrepresentation 
exception to the parol evidence rule on grounds of substantive law 
and public policy. 
2. Merger Doctrine. 
The merger doctrine should not preclude consideration of 
plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation case for the same reasons 
which bar application of the parol evidence rule in fraud cases. 
II. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION IS NOT 
BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, SINCE THE EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT. 
Plaintiff has met its burden of showing the existence of 
genuine issues of material fact on each of the disputed elements of 
its intentional misrepresentation claim. Furthermore, the case of 
Maack v. Resource Design & Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 
1994) is clearly distinguishable on its facts and therefore not 
dispositive of the reasonable reliance issue. 
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III. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION IS NOT BARRED 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, SINCE THE EXISTENCE OF MATERIAL FACTS HAS BEEN 
ESTABLISHED BY PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT. 
Plaintiff has met its burden of showing the existence of 
genuine issues of material fact on each of the disputed elements of 
its intentional misrepresentation claim. In addition, plaintiff is 
entitled to recover its actual economic loss damages in the absence 
of any physical damage to the roof. 
IV. 
PLAINTIFF'S REFORMATION OF CONTRACT CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY THE 
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE OR MERGER DOCTRINE. 
A. Parol Evidence Rule. 
Mistake is an exception to the parol evidence rule. Parol 
evidence to show such mistake may be introduced in an action in 
equity to reform the written contract. 
B. Merger Doctrine. 
Mistake is an exception to the merger doctrine. Parol 
evidence is admissible in a reformation action on grounds of 
mistake. 
V. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF ENTITLEMENT TO EQUITABLE REFORMATION OF 
CONTRACT IS NOT BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, SINCE THE EXISTENCE OF 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT. 
Plaintiff has met its burden of showing the existence of 
genuine issues of material fact on each of the disputed elements of 
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its reformation of contract claim. The parties made a mutual 
mistake in failing to include appropriate roof warranty language in 
the Closing Statement in view of the mistaken assumption that such 
a warranty was being assigned as part of the contract and therefore 
need not be specifically mentioned. In the alternative, plaintiff 
made a unilateral mistake regarding the omission of roof warranty 
language which was induced by defendant's inequitable or 
affirmative fraudulent conduct. Proof of a unilateral mistake of 





Plaintiff's complaint against defendant 5900 Associates sets 
forth eight related claims for relief including: breach of oral 
contract, general equitable relief, intentional misrepresentation, 
negligent misrepresentation, and mutual mistake. [R. 2-11.] These 
claims arose from certain representations and promises allegedly 
make by Briggs to Smalley during the course of negotiations for the 
purchase and sale of the Property. Smalley Affidavit. [R. 74-92.] 
In this case, plaintiff agrees that the written contract 
documents reproduced in Addenda A, B, and C respectively contain an 
"as is" provision and are not otherwise ambiguous. Plaintiff 
contends, however, that its acceptance of the Property is an "as 
is" condition is subject to proof of fraud in the inducement of the 
purchase, or, in the alternative, proof of mistake justifying 
reformation of the contract to include the roof warranty. Proof of 
these allegations is not barred as a matter of law since neither 
the parol evidence rule nor the merger doctrine applies to such 
claims, and because plaintiff has raised genuine issues of material 
fact by affidavit. Plaintiff's contentions are more fully set 
forth in points I through V below. 
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I. 
PLAINTIFF'S FRAUD CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE PAROL EVIDENCE 
RULE OR MERGER DOCTRINES. 
A. Intentional Misrepresentation. 
1. Parol Evidence Rule 
The trial court's conclusion that the "as is" provision 
contained in the Closing Statement controls the case and prevents 
enforcement of an oral promise to provide a roof warranty is not 
applicable to plaintiff's fraud claim, in view of the Utah Supreme 
Court's holding that fraud is an exception to the parol evidence 
rule: 
The parol evidence rule as a principle of contract 
interpretation has a very narrow application. Simply 
stated, the rule operates in the absence of fraud to 
exclude contemporaneous conversations, statements, or 
representations offered for the purpose of varying or 
adding to the terms of an integrated contract... 
This general rule as stated contains an exception 
for fraud. Parol evidence is admissible to show the 
circumstances under which the contract was made or the 
purpose for which the writing was executed. This is so 
even after the writing is determined to be an integrated 
contract. Admitting parol evidence in such circumstances 
avoids the judicial enforcement of a writing that appears 
to be a binding integration but in fact is not. 
What appears to be a complete and binding integrated 
agreement may be a forgery, a joke, a sham, or an 
agreement without consideration, or it may be voidable 
for fraud, duress, mistake, or the like, or it may be 
illegal. Such invalidating causes need not and commonly 
do not appear on the face of the writing. 
Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985) (citing 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214 cmt. c (1981)). 
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This is consistent with the well-accepted general rule that an 
"as isM provision in a real estate contract does not bar a buyer's 
claim based on allegations of fraud. Frank J. Wozniak, Annotation, 
Construction and Effect of Provision in Contract for Sale of Realty 
by Which Purchaser Agrees to Take Property "As Is" or in Its 
Existing Condition. 8 ALR 5th 312, 328 (1992); 29A Am. Jur 2d 
Evidence §1092 (1994). 
2. Merger Doctrine 
The same exception applies in the case of the merger doctrine. 
Thus in Lamb v. Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974) the Utah Supreme 
Court held on grounds of public policy that "a contract clause 
limiting liability will not be applied in a fraud action" 
notwithstanding the merger doctrine. Id. at 608. See also Embassy 
Group Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1371 (Utah App. 1993). 
Consequently, the alleged misrepresentations of defendant's 
managing agent may be considered to determine whether plaintiff has 
stated a valid cause of action for intentional misrepresentation 
and demonstrated the existence of material issues of fact 
precluding summary judgment. 
B. Negligent Misrepresentation. 
1. Parol Evidence Rule. 
In Maack v. Resource Design & Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570 
(Utah App. 1994), this court assumed without deciding that the 
plaintiff's claim of negligent misrepresentation was an exception 
to the "as is" clause in an agreement to purchase real estate, 
thereby avoiding the effect of the parol evidence rule. Id. at 
14 
575. Although the degree to which the trial court may have relied 
on the parol evidence rule in granting summary judgment on 
plaintiff's negligent misrepresentation claim is unclear, plaintiff 
nevertheless contends that negligent misrepresentation presents an 
exception in the same way and for the same reasons as intentional 
fraud. [R. Ill; Tr. 9, R. 137.] 
A number of courts have recently addressed this question and 
found in favor of the exception. In Formento v. Encanto Business 
Park, 744 P. 2d 22 (Ariz. App. 1987), for example, the Arizona 
Court of Appeals squarely held that the parol evidence rule was not 
applicable to a negligent misrepresentation claim. Id. at 26. 
In Formento, aggrieved purchasers brought suit against the 
sellers of an industrial park on grounds of fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, and breach of warranty, arising out of alleged 
negligent misrepresentations and express warranties made both 
before and after execution of the purchase agreement. Id. at 23, 
25. The written agreement itself contained a standard integration 
clause excluding all agreements, statements, representations, and 
promises outside the original written document. Id. at 24. The 
trial court ruled that the parol evidence rule precluded 
consideration of any evidence of representations or warranties 
outside the agreement and granted defendant's motion for a directed 
verdict. Id. at 25. Plaintiffs appealed. Id. 
On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals carefully considered 
plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in applying the parol 
evidence rule to exclude evidence of defendant's alleged 
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misrepresentations. Id. The court's analysis of this question is 
instructive: 
Formento claims that there is no logical reason to 
distinguish between negligent and fraudulent 
misrepresentations because, in both instances, the harm 
done to the party relying on the misrepresentations is 
the same. Their argument is based on Hill v. Jones, 
supra, a recent Division One case. In Hill, the issue 
was whether a seller has a duty to disclose to the buyer 
the existence of termite damage in a residential dwelling 
known to the seller, but not to the buyer, which 
materially affects the value of the property. The Hills 
had alleged that the sellers, the Joneses, made 
representations that what was actually termite damage in 
the residence was water damage, and had failed to 
disclose the existence of the termite damage and the 
history of the infestation in the residence. The trial 
court dismissed the misrepresentation claim based on an 
integration clause in the agreement between the parties. 
The appellate court reversed, holding that a duty to 
disclose did exist. The court stated: 
"Although the law of contracts supports the finality 
of transactions, over the years courts have recognized 
that under certain limited circumstances it is unjust to 
strictly enforce the policy favoring finality... 
There is also a judicial policy promoting honesty and 
fair dealing in business relationships. This policy is 
expressed in the law of fraudulent and negligent 
misrepresentations. Where a misrepresentation is 
fraudulent or where a negligent misrepresentation is one 
of material fact, the policy of finality rightly gives 
way to the policy of promoting honest dealing between the 
parties. [citation omitted] [Nondisclosure may be 
equated with and given the same legal effect as fraud and 
misrepresentation. One category of cases where this has 
been done involves the area of nondisclosure of material 
facts affecting the value of property, known to the 
seller but not reasonably capable of being known to the 
buyer." 
The Hill court recognized that a seller should not 
be allowed to hide behind an integration clause to avoid 
the consequences of a misrepresentation, whether 
fraudulent or negligent. We agree. Formento is entitled 
to a trial on the merits of the issue of negligent 
misrepresentation, and the parol evidence rule cannot be 
used by Encanto as a shield against its own 
representations. 
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Formento, 744 P.2d at 26. 
The Formento court reached the same conclusion using a 
contract law analysis. 
We are also able to reach the same conclusion using 
a different analysis. The parol evidence rule is a rule 
of substantive contract law, and a claim of negligent 
misrepresentation sounds in tort. Therefore, as stated 
in Van Buren v. Pima Community College Dist. Bd. , supra, 
a claim for negligent misrepresentation is governed by 
the law of negligence, and the parol evidence rule is 
inapplicable. 
Arizona has adopted § 552 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts (1977). Other jurisdictions that 
recognize an action for the tort of negligent 
misrepresentation have admitted parol evidence to prove 
the claim. See, e.g., Nashua Trust Co. v. Weisman, 122 
N.H. 397, 445 A.2d 1101 (1982); APLications, Inc. v. 
Hewitt-Packard Co., 501 F.Supp. 129 (S.D. N.Y. 1980), 
aff'd, 672 F.2d 1076 (1982); National Bldg. Leasing, Inc. 
v. Byler, 252 Pa.Super. 370, 381 A.2d 963 (1977); Haynes 
v. Cumberland Builders, Inc., 546 S.W. 2d 228 (Tenn. App. 
1976); but see, Wilkinson v. Carpenter, 276 Or. 311, 554 
P.2d 512 (1976). 
Id. at 26-27 (textual citations omitted). 
Plaintiff contends that the Utah Court of Appeals should adopt 
the same exception discussed above and hold that the parol evidence 
rule does not preclude evidence of any understandings or 
representations made prior to, contemporaneously with, or 
subsequent to the execution of a written, integrated real estate 
contract insofar as such representations are relevant to a claim of 
negligent misrepresentation. The parol evidence rule should not be 
used as a shield against a party's negligent misrepresentations of 
material fact for the same public policy and substantive law 
reasons relied upon in Formento and similar cases. Insofar as the 
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trial court's ruling may be construed to rest upon this ground, it 
was erroneous and should be reversed. 
2. Merger Doctrine. 
As indicated above, the Utah Supreme Court has held that the 
merger doctrine is inapplicable to fraud actions on grounds of 
public policy. Lamb v. Banqart, 575 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah 1974). 
Plaintiff contends that the same public policy reasons which bar 
application of the parol evidence rule in fraud and negligent 
misrepresentation cases applies here. Thus the merger doctrine 
should not preclude consideration of plaintiff's negligent 
misrepresentation case. 
II. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION IS NOT 
BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, SINCE THE EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT. 
A. Elements of Intentional Misrepresentation 
The elements of a cause of action based upon intentional 
misrepresentation are: 
(1) a representation; (2) concerning a presently 
existing material fact; (3) which was false; (4) which 
the representor either (a)knew to be false, or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge 
upon which to base such representation; (5) for the 
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) 
that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance 
of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was 
thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and damage. 
Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1246 (Utah 1980). 
The particular factual allegations supporting these elements 
are set forth in paragraphs 7 through 18 of plaintiff's complaint 
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and are incorporated by reference in its sixth cause of action. [R. 
3-5;8.] The defendant denies that such promises were ever made, 
and further denies "each and every element of fraud." [R. 125; 29.] 
Defendant further claims that "several of the elements do not 
involve disputed facts." [R. 29.] 
In granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the 
trial court agreed concluding: 
(e) That plaintiff's tort claims must fail because 
of lack of damages; lack of reasonable reliance in light 
of the "as is" contract; lack of misrepresentation of a 
presently existing fact; and lack of evidence of an 
intent to deceive. [R. 111.] 
Plaintiff contends that each of these conclusions is erroneous 
and should be reversed. 
B. Disputed Issues of Fact. 
1. Presently Existing Material Facts 
According to Alan Smalley's affidavit, the following 
representations were made by Barlow Briggs during negotiations for 
plaintiff's purchase of the Property: 
(1) The building had been completely re-roofed by Layton 
Roofing. Smalley Affidavit 54. [R. 75.] 
(2) Layton Roofing had made a warranty on the roof. Smalley 
Affidavit 5 4,6. [R. 75.] 
(3) The roof warranty was in existence. Smalley Affidavit 54. 
[R. 75.] 
(4) Layton Roofing had given the roof warranty to defendant 
for a period of five (5) years as part of the roofing contract. 
Smalley Affidavit 56. [R. 75.] 
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(5) Defendant's present promissory intention was to provide 
plaintiff with the warranty. Smalley Affidavit f 4. [R. 75.] 
(6) Defendant's present promissory intention was to assign 
the warranty to plaintiff in connection with plaintiff's purchase 
of the property. Smalley Affidavit 5 5,7. [R. 76.] 
(7) All of the above representations by Briggs took place 
prior to the sale. Smalley Affidavit fl 8. [R. 76.] 
Defendant argued below and the court apparently accepted the 
contention that this element must fail as a matter of law since a 
promise to provide plaintiff with a roof warranty in the future 
"could not be a representation of a presently existing fact." [R. 
29, 111.] This conclusion ignores the circumstance that a promise 
to provide such a warranty in connection with a sale of real estate 
necessarily involves a particular state of mind, the present 
intention of the promisor. It is also contrary to the well settled 
rule that a "misrepresentation of a present promissory intention is 
a misrepresentation of a presently existing fact. " Galloway v. 
AFCO Dev. Corp., 777 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah App. 1989). See also 
Audalex Resources v. Meyers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1047-48 (Utah App. 
1994) . 
In addition, this was not the sole misrepresentation. There 
were others as listed above such as the existence of the warranty 
itself which clearly pertain to presently existing facts. 
Consequently, the trial court's reliance on this ground in awarding 
summary judgment was misplaced. 
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2. Intent to Deceive (Scienter). 
In this action it is uncontroverted that defendant 5900 
Associates owned the office building which was the subject of the 
purchase agreement and that Barlow Briggs was the manager of this 
company. Briggs Affidavit 55 1,2. [R. 41.] He was therefore, in a 
superior position to know the extent to which roofing repairs had 
been made, and whether defendant had received a roof warranty 
covering the work. According to Alan Smalley, Briggs made numerous 
representations about the state of the roof warranty prior to sale 
which later turned out to be completely false. Smalley Affidavit 55 
3-15. [R. 74-77.] At one point during negotiations, he even told 
Smalley that his request for the roof warranty was "acceptable," 
but later stated in his affidavit that "it was never affiant's 
intention to have this [roof warranty] as a condition of the sales 
contract." Smalley Affidavit 55. [R. 75.] Briggs Affidavit 57. [R. 
42.] These contrary views of the matter in the absence of any 
discovery are sufficient to create the inference of defendant's 
intent to deceive based upon Brigg's actual knowledge of the 
situation or of his recklessness knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representations. 
3. Reasonable Reliance. 
In granting summary judgment against the plaintiff in this 
case, the trial court relied heavily on this court's recent 
decision in Maack v. Resource Design & Constr., Inc., 875 P.2d 570 
(Utah App. 1994). As here, Maack involved an "as is" contract to 
purchase real estate, an alleged misrepresentation that the 
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premises were covered by a one year builder's warranty, and 
allegations of intentional and negligent misrepresentation by the 
buyers against whom summary judgment was entered. Id. 
Defendant argued below that Maack was dispositive of 
plaintiff's fraud claim on the element of reliance. [R. 133-34.] 
The court agreed concluding that plaintiff failed to establish 
reasonable reliance as a matter of law. [R. 111.] 
The error in the trial court's conclusion is that Maack is 
distinguishable on the particular facts which control the outcome. 
In Maack, the plaintiff home buyers purchased a newly-constructed 
home "as is" without any warranties as to its condition. 
The Maacks did not have the home inspected before 
they agreed to purchase it, nor did they make the 
purchase contingent upon a satisfactory inspection 
report. They allege that they concluded an inspection 
was unnecessary based upon a representation made by 
Jarvik's real estate agent, Maclyn Kesselring. Although 
the parties disagree on the timing of Kesselring's 
statement—the Maacks claim it was before the signing of 
the Agreement while Kesselring claims it was after—it is 
undisputed that Kesselring told the Maacks that the house 
was subject to a one year builder's warranty covering 
defects, material, and workmanship. The Maacks did not 
ask to review the builder's warranty, nor did they ask 
for particular details concerning the warranty. The sale 
was later completed and the Maacks moved in. 
Id. at 573 
Shortly after moving into the home, the Maacks encountered 
problems with water leakage. This led ultimately to a lawsuit in 
which they sought damages from the contractor and previous owner. 
The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants 
and plaintiffs appealed. This court affirmed the trial court's 
ruling holding in pertinent part that the plaintiff's negligent 
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misrepresentation claim must fail for lack of reasonable reliance. 
Id. at 577-78, 
In Maack, it was undisputed that the plaintiffs failed to take 
any steps to ascertain the truth of the real estate agent's 
misrepresentation before relying on it to their detriment: 
It is undisputed that the Maacks did not ask for 
details regarding the scope of the alleged builder's 
warranty, did not ask to review a copy of the warranty, 
and did not reguire that reference to the warranty be 
included in the Agreement. Additionally, the Maacks did 
not inquire as to the date of expiration of the warranty. 
Because the house was completed in approximately July 
1987, the Maacks were on notice that it was entirely 
possible that the warranty had expired or was very close 
to expiration at the time they signed the Agreement. In 
addition, Mr. Maack, as an experienced attorney, was on 
notice that reliance was unreasonable by the Agreement's 
express provisions that the property was sold" as is," 
with no warranties other than those expressly stated, and 
that it superseded any prior oral or written agreements. 
For these reasons, we conclude as a matter of law that 
the Maacks did not reasonably rely on Kesselring's 
statement and did not exercise due diligence with respect 
to the existence of the alleged builder's warranty. 
Id. at 577. 
In strong contrast to the facts in Maack, the evidence in the 
record of this case plainly shows that plaintiff did take the 
following steps: 
1. Smalley specifically raised the issue of the roof 
warranty with Briggs in connection with plaintiff's negotiations to 
purchase the property. Smalley Affidavit 14. [R. 75.] 
2. The roof warranty was intended to cover both labor and 
materials and would "exclude only damage caused by the owner or his 
agents, and any damage resulting from mechanical or heating/air 
23 
conditioning or ventilation systems operation or malfunction (the 
'Warranty')." Smalley Affidavit 54- [R. 75.] 
3. Briggs promised to provide Smalley with the warranty, 
ostensibly for inspection. Smalley Affidavit I 4. [R. 75.] 
4. Smalley followed up on this discussion with a written 
request for the warranty prior to sale. Smalley Affidavit 1 5, [R. 
75. ] 
5. Briggs responded in writing that Smalley's request was 
"acceptable." Smalley Affidavit H 5. [R. 75.] 
6. Smalley continued to request the warranty and Briggs 
continued to reassure him right up to the closing and for several 
weeks beyond. Smalley Affidavit ff 6-12. [R. 75-76.] 
Based on the foregoing efforts by the plaintiff to ask for 
details about the warranty; request a copy for review; insist upon 
delivery of the warranty both before and after sale; and include 
language in both contract documents requiring the Seller to 
personally warrant those items specifically excluded by a standard 
roof warranty which it believed existed; plaintiff contends that a 
material issue of fact exists which precludes judgment as a matter 
of law on the reliance issue. Whether plaintiff took reasonable 
steps under the circumstances to ascertain the truth of defendant's 
representations becomes a question of fact once plaintiff 
demonstrates that it took some steps to do so as opposed to no 
steps as was the case in Maack. The trial court's ruling to the 
contrary is erroneous and should be reversed. 
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4. Damages. 
Defendant argued below and the court concluded that 
plaintiff's fraud claims must fail because of a lack of any damage. 
The basis of this ruling apparently was that because the roof does 
not presently leak or need any repairs, the claim is moot. [R. 29; 
131-32] 
Defendant's analysis fails to account for plaintiff's economic 
loss of the benefit of the bargain. In Utah, the measure of 
damages for fraud and deceit is the 
difference between the actual value of what the 
party received and the value thereof if it had been as 
represented; this is the benefit of the bargain rule. 
Under this rule the defrauded party is compensated for 
the loss of his bargain and is not confined to his out-
of-the-pocket damages. 
Lamb v. Banqart, 525 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah 1974). 
According to Alan Smalley's affidavit, Layton Roofing is 
unwilling to issue a roof warranty without payment of a sum in 
excess of $19,000 which will enable it to perform the additional 
work reguired to support the warranty. Smalley Affidavit I 15. [R. 
77.] If defendant's representations about the roof warranty had 
been true and been honored, the purchase price paid by plaintiff 
would have included the value of this warranty. Defendant's 
failure to provide the warranty means that the actual value of the 
property was less than the value as represented, and has caused 
plaintiff to suffer economic losses to its damage in excess of 
$19,000. Thus plaintiff has established a claim for damages under 
applicable law based in part upon disputed issues of fact. It is 
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therefore entitled to a reversal of the summary judgment against it 
on its claim of intentional misrepresentation. 
III. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION IS NOT BARRED 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, SINCE THE EXISTENCE OF MATERIAL FACTS HAS BEEN 
ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT. 
A. Elements of Negligent Misrepresentation. 
The elements of a cause of action based upon negligent 
misrepresentation have been defined as follows: 
Where (1) one having a pecuniary interest in a 
transaction, (2) is in a superior position to know 
material facts, and (3) carelessly or negligently makes 
a false representation concerning them, (4) expecting the 
other party to rely and act thereon, and (5) the other 
party reasonably does so and (6) suffers loss in that 
transaction, the representor can be held responsible if 
the other elements of fraud are also present. 
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 423 P.2d 659, 662 (Utah 1967) 
(subdivisions added). See also Christenson v. Commonwealth Land 
Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 302, 305 (Utah 1983). See generally 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §552 (1965). 
The particular factual allegations supporting these elements 
are set forth in paragraphs 7 through 18 of plaintiff's complaint 
and are incorporated by reference in its seventh cause of action. 
[R. 3-5; 8.] The defendant denies that such promises were ever 
made, and further denies "each and every element of fraud." [R. 
125; 29.] Defendant further claims that "several of the elements do 
not involve disputed facts." [R. 29.] 
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In granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the 
lower court agreed concluding: 
(e) That plaintiff's tort claims must fail because 
of lack of damages; lack of reasonable reliance in light 
of the "as is" contract' lack of misrepresentation of a 
presently existing fact; and lack of evidence of an 
intent to deceive. [R. 111.] 
Plaintiff contends that each of these conclusions is erroneous 
and should be reversed. 
B. Disputed Issues of Fact. 
In reaching the above conclusions, the trial court failed to 
distinguish further between plaintiff's intentional and negligent 
misrepresentation claims and ruled that dismissal was warranted on 
the same grounds for both. Conseguently, plaintiff asserts that 
the same factual and legal arguments presented in support of 
reversal on its intentional misrepresentation claim apply equally 
here. In addition, however, since the defendant contends that the 
plaintiff's fraud claims must both fail because of lack of any 
physical damage to the roof, further discussion of the damage 
element is warranted. [R. 29; 131-32.] 
Even through this particular variation of common law fraud 
sounds in negligence, courts have long recognized that economic 
loss damages are recoverable. See, e.g. , Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. 
Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986) (negligent 
survey); Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 
302 (Utah 1983) (negligent acknowledgment of document); Dugan v. 
Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) (negligent discrepancy in 
acreage). 
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Consequently, defendant's contention which would limit 
recovery of damages for negligent misrepresentation in this case to 
physical damage to the property is without merit. Since plaintiff 
has established a claim for damages based in part upon disputed 
issues of fact, it is entitled to a reversal of the adverse summary 
judgment on its claim of negligent misrepresentation. 
IV. 
PLAINTIFF'S REFORMATION OF CONTRACT CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY THE 
PAROL EVIDENCE RULE OR MERGER DOCTRINE. 
A. Parol Evidence Rule. 
The parol evidence rule generally precludes the use of 
extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an 
unambiguous, integrated contract. Hall v. Process Instruments and 
Control, Inc., 866 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1993). The rule is subject 
to many limitations and exceptions, however, including cases in 
which the writing is subject to claims of mistake. 
Parol evidence generally is admissible to alter the terms of 
a written contract when it is shown that, by reason of a mistake, 
the true intention of the parties was not expressed. Grahn v. 
Gregory, 800 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 
(Utah 1991); Warner v. Sirstins, 838 P.2d 666 (Utah App. 1992). See 
also 29A Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 1112 (1994). Parol evidence to 
show such mistake may be introduced in an action in eguity to 
reform the written contract. Janke v. Beckstead, 332 P. 2d 933 (Utah 
1958). See also 66 Am. Jur.2d Reformation of Instruments § 118 
(1973) . 
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B. Merger Doctrine, 
The doctrine of merger is applied to establish the 
completeness of final real estate contracts by extinguishing all 
prior agreements, whether written or oral, and merging them into 
the deed of conveyance. Embassy Group v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366 (Utah 
App. 1993). This rule is subject to the exceptions of fraud, 
mistake, and the existence of collateral rights in the contract of 
sale. Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790, 793 (Utah 1986). 
In suits to reform written instruments on the ground of 
mistake, parol evidence is admissible to show the nature of the 
mistake and how the writing should be corrected to conform to the 
agreement or intention which the parties actually had. Janke v. 
Beckstead, 332 P.2d 933 (Utah 1958). See also 66 Am.Jur.2d 
Reformation of Instruments § 118 (1973). 
V. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM OF ENTITLEMENT TO EQUITABLE REFORMATION OF 
CONTRACT IS NOT BARRED AS A MATTER OF LAW, SINCE THE EXISTENCE OF 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY AFFIDAVIT. 
A. Elements of Reformation Claim. 
Under Utah law, a party seeking reformation of a contract has 
the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that: 
1. the instrument does not conform to the intent of 
both parties; 
2. the claimant was mistaken regarding the content of 
the instrument and the other party knew of the mistake but kept 
silent; or 
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3. the claimant was mistaken as to actual content due 
to "fraudulent affirmative behavior." 
Jensen v. Manila Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, 565 P.2d 63, 64-65 (Utah 1977). See also, Mabev 
v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 287, 290 (Utah 1984); Embassy 
Group, Inc. v. Hatch, 865 P.2d 1366, 1371-72, (Utah App. 1993). 
The Utah Supreme Court has further stated that a contract may 
be reformed for either of the following reasons: 
First, if the instrument does not embody the 
intentions of both parties to the contract, a mutual 
mistake has occurred, and reformation is appropriate. 
Second, if one party is laboring under a mistake about a 
contract term and that mistake either has been induced by 
the other party or is known by and conceded to by the 
other party, then the inequitable nature of the other 
party's conduct will have the same operable effect as a 
mistake, and reformation is permissible. E.G., Thompson 
v. Smith, Utah, 620 P.2d 520, 523 (1980). 
Briggs v. Liddell, 699 P.2d 770, 772 (Utah 1985). 
The particular factual allegations supporting plaintiff's 
claims of mutual mistake or unilateral mistake induced by 
defendant's inequitable conduct are set forth in paragraphs 7 
through 18 of plaintiff's complaint and are incorporated by 
reference in its third cause of action. [R. 3-5; 7.] Defendant 
denies that the underlying promises leading to the mistake were 
ever made (in itself creating a disputed issue of fact) and asserts 
the absence of any material issues of fact supporting the claim. 
[R. 27; 125.] 
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In granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the 
trial court agreed, concluding 
(d) That plaintiff's claim for reformation must 
fail for lack of a mutual mistake, lack of materiality, 
lack of prejudice, existence of two written contracts, 
and lack of any claimed facts that would overcome the 
clear and convincing evidence burden. 
[R. 111.] 
Plaintiff contends that these conclusions are erroneous and 
should be reversed. 
B. Disputed Issues of Fact. 
1. Lack of Mutual Mistake. 
Since plaintiff has presented sworn testimony to the effect 
that both parties intended to include the roof warranty as part of 
their transaction, a material issue of fact exists regarding the 
parties intentions and whether the mistake was mutual. Smalley 
Affidavit flf 4-10. [R. 75-76.] Briggs Affidavit f 7. [R. 41.] The 
mutual mistake involved the omission of the standard roof warranty 
promised by defendant which was not assigned as part of the sale. 
In addition, there is abundant evidence in the record to 
support a claim of unilateral mistake induced by defendant's 
inequitable or fraudulent conduct. Smalley Affidavit HI 4-10. [R. 
75-76.] Briggs Affidavit 5 7. [R. 41.] Accordingly, the court's 
ruling on this issue was erroneous. 
2* Lack of Materiality. 
Defendant argued below that any mistake would have been 
"comparatively immaterial" because of the difference between the 
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purchase price ($1,420,000) and the cost of a roof warranty 
($19,000). [R. 131.] 
A matter is considered to be material "if it is one to which 
a reasonable person would attach importance in determining his 
choice of action in the transaction in question." Hill v. Jones, 
725 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Ariz. App. 1986) (quoting Lynn v. Taylor, 642 
P.2d 131, 134-35 (Kan. App. 1982)). 
In this case, plaintiff has presented sworn testimony that it 
relied on the defendant's representations regarding the roof 
warranty in proceeding to close the transaction. Smalley Affidavit 
f 9. [R. 76.] Plaintiff would not have closed the sale without the 
representation. Smalley Affidavit 5 8. [R. 76.] Both its pre-sale 
and post-sale actions corrobate the importance plaintiff attached 
to the warranty. Accordingly, the question of materiality is 
placed squarely in issue. 
3. Lack of Prejudice. 
Defendant asserts that plaintiff must demonstrate some 
prejudice if the contract is not reformed. [R. 130.] Plaintiff has 
met this burden by presenting sworn testimony that the cost of 
obtaining a roof warranty from Layton Roofing is in excess of 
$19,000. Smalley Affidavit 5 15. [R. 77.] Defendant has 
challenged this figure. [R. 131.] A dispute exists with respect to 
this material fact as well. 
4. Antecedent Contracts. 
In this case, the Earnest Money Sales Agreement was signed on 
May 21, 1993, and the Closing Statement on June 30, 1993. [R. 45-
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50.] Both agreements include the HVAC warranties and omit the roof 
warranty. Plaintiff contends that an error occurred in drafting 
the Closing Statement to omit the roof warranty which had not been 
assigned as part of the closing transaction as the parties 
intended. As late as April 22, 1993, Briggs had agreed in writing 
that plaintiff's request for a roof warranty was "acceptable." 
Smalley f 5. [R. 75.] He subsequently denied any intention of 
including it in the sale. Briggs Affidavit 5 7 [R. 42.] The 
inclusion of the HVAC warranties in the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement reflects plaintiff's understanding and belief that the 
roof warranty would be assigned, since such a warranty generally 
excludes HVAC operations. Smalley Affidavit 5 7. [R. 75.] The 
mistaken omission of roof warranty language in the Closing 
Statement was a result of either a mutual mistake that the roof 
warranty was or would be assigned as part of the transaction or 
upon a unilateral mistake induced by defendant's inequitable 
conduct in continually making such misrepresentations. 
5* Clear and Convincing Evidence. 
Under Utah law, a party moving for summary judgment must 
establish the right based on the applicable law as applied to 
undisputed material issues of fact. A party opposing the motion 
need only demonstrate the existence of a material issue of fact in 
order to prevail. Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 654-
55 (Utah 1994). Furthermore, a motion for summary judgment may be 
used only to determine the existence of a material issue of fact, 
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not to determine which party's case is more persuasive. Id. at 
655. 
In this case, plaintiff has demonstrated the existence of 
several material issues of fact bearing on the various elements of 
its reformation claim. The trial court's summary judgment should 
therefore be reversed to allow plaintiff the opportunity to prove 
its case by clear and convincing evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has met its burden in response to defendant's motion 
for summary judgment by presenting sworn testimony establishing the 
existence of genuine issues of material fact on its claims of 
intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and 
equitable reformation of contract. Plaintiff has also demonstrated 
that defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on 
its affirmative defenses of parol evidence and merger as applied to 
the above claims. The summary judgment entered in favor of 
defendant should therefore be reversed and the case remanded to the 
trial court for resolution of these disputed issues of material 
fact. 
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